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2005 > |
Course
Description |
Experimental
Economics
Daniel Houser
George Mason University, USA
This course introduces students to experimental economics, with a particular focus on the way experimental economics has contributed to cognitive science. A robust model of individual decision making is developed. This model is used to motivate experimental investigations of cooperation and trust, the way cooperation and trust vary between individuals and the impact this can have on cooperative outcomes in groups. These findings are used to motivate experimental research on sanctions and their efficacy in enforcing cooperative outcomes. Within this context students are introduced to brain imaging studies of trust and cooperation, which provides initial exposure to research in neuroeconomics.
Lecture 1. Individual Decision Making
Required readings:
Optional readings:
Lecture 2. Individual Differences
Required readings:
Optional readings:
Lecture 3. Trust and Markets
Required readings:
Optional readings:
Hoffman, E. McCabe, K. and Smith, V. (1998). Behavioral Foundations
of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology. Economic
Inquiry, 36, 335-352.
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity,
by F. Fukuyama, 1996, Free Press (especially Part I.)
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., and Smith, V. (1994).
PRequired readingss, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games. Games
and Economic Behavior, 7, 346-380.
Lecture 4.
Sanctions and Avoiding Market Failure
Required readings:
Optional readings:
Gneezy,
U. and Rustichini, A. (2000). “A Fine is a Price.” Journal of Legal Studies,
1-18.
Lecture 5.
Neuroeconomics
Required readings:
Optional readings:
Small Group Sessions
Small groups meetings will be used to provide an extended discussion of the topics covered in the larger group meetings.
Assignments
Students wishing to receive credit for this course must (i)
verify their attendance by providing a one paragraph summary of the main points
from each lecture; and (ii) produce a five page proposal for original
experimental research on cooperation. This proposal should (a) indicate the
specific research question and hypotheses and motivate the question’s importance;
(b) fully describe an experiment that will address the research question and
indicate clearly how the hypotheses are tested; (c) speculate on the results of
the research: precisely what will have been learned.
Daniel Houser
Daniel Houser earned his B.A. in Mathematics at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and his Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Minnesota in 1998. He was a member of the economics faculty at the University of Arizona, and since 2002 has been Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University. In addition to the economics department, Professor Houser holds faculty affiliations in the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, the Center for Study of Public Choice, the Center for Study of Law and Neuroeconomics, and the School of Computational Science. He has published widely in leading science journals, and is associate editor of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Professor Houser has previously lectured at experimental economics summer schools held by the University of Arizona, George Mason University, the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics, Purdue University, University of Mannheim and the Russell Sage Foundation.